Proffer agreement; Specific performance; Distinguishing People v Jackson; Narration testimony; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; People v Fomby; Burden shifting; Prosecutorial error; People v Fyda; Prosecutorial misconduct; Innuendo; MRPC 3.4(e); Hearsay; Impeachment; MRE 613(b); Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); People v Hall

The court held that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the proffer agreement, a new trial, or resentencing. He was convicted of felony murder after evidence showed that the victim was followed by two masked men at a hotel, attacked outside, shot twice in the back, and left without his backpack. On appeal, the court first held that the prosecution did not have to honor the proffer agreement because the agreement remained in effect only if defendant gave a “truthful and complete statement,” and trial evidence strongly indicated that he lied by minimizing his alleged accomplice’s (S) involvement. The court distinguished Jackson because, unlike that case, defendant “breached the agreement by lying about the involvement of” S. The court next held that detectives’ narration of hotel security footage was admissible lay opinion under MRE 701 because they closely reviewed numerous videos, the testimony helped the jury follow the suspects’ movements, and neither detective improperly opined on defendant’s guilt. The court also rejected defendant’s burden-shifting claim because the prosecutor’s comments challenged the weakness of defendant’s self-defense theory rather than requiring him to prove innocence, and the prosecutor permissibly argued that defendant’s version was “uncorroborated by any single piece of evidence.” It further found that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by suggesting defendant changed his story during the proffer process because defendant admitted he understood the prosecution wanted him to cooperate against S as the shooter, so the prosecutor had a basis to ask about that inconsistency. As to S’s letter, the court agreed it was inadmissible because defendant neither wrote nor read it during the relevant timeframe. But it found no error affecting substantial rights given the “overwhelming amount of evidence demonstrating that [S] was the person who shot” the victim, including testimony that S apologized for shooting him. Finally, the court held that mandatory LWOP for felony murder was not cruel or unusual punishment for defendant, who was 27, because Hall remains binding for defendants age 21 or older. Affirmed.