Bindover; Motion to quash; Probable cause; People v Taylor; Kidnapping; Restraint; MCL 750.349; CSC II under MCL 750.520c(1)(c); Momentary restraint; People v Chelmicki; Victim resistance; People v Kosik

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by binding defendant over on kidnapping and CSC II charges, and the circuit court did not err by denying his motion to quash. The complainant, a 16-year-old who had been stranded outside at night without a working phone connection, accepted defendant’s offer of food, Wi-Fi, and a place to charge his phone. On appeal, defendant argued that the kidnapping charge failed because the complainant voluntarily went to defendant’s home, received food and access to Wi-Fi, and was not physically held there. The court rejected that argument, explaining that MCL 750.349 defines “restrain” as restricting a person’s movements or confining the person in a way that interferes with liberty without consent, and that the Legislature imposed no minimum time requirement. The court emphasized that restraint may exist even if the victim is “held for even a moment,” and the prosecution does not have to show that the victim resisted. The court held that the evidence supported bindover because, once inside defendant’s bedroom, defendant repeatedly touched the complainant, grabbed him from behind around the torso, kissed him, slapped his rear end, made inappropriate comments and gestures, told him there were other people in the home, and discouraged him from contacting anyone. The complainant testified that defendant was larger than he was, that he became scared and uncomfortable, and that he felt he “couldn’t move” after defendant began touching him and telling him not to call or text anyone. Because conflicting evidence and reasonable doubt about guilt are for the jury at the bindover stage, the district court’s probable-cause determination was not outside the range of principled outcomes. Affirmed.