42 USC § 1983 action alleging withholding of evidence & fabrication of evidence; Interlocutory jurisdiction; Qualified immunity; The Heck v Humphrey doctrine; Claims under Brady v Maryland; Waiver of argument that plaintiffs’ rights were not “clearly established”; Malicious prosecution; Collateral estoppel under Michigan law; MCR 6.502; MCL 691.1755(8); Lack of “probable cause” to arrest

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In this § 1983 case arising from wrongful convictions, the court concluded it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction over several aspects of the appeal and dismissed them. It held that collateral estoppel did not bar plaintiffs-Cotton and Legion’s malicious prosecution claim against defendant-Hughes and that the district court properly denied defendant-Bates qualified immunity on their fabrication of evidence claim. Plaintiffs spent nearly 20 years in prison on murder convictions that were vacated after “evidence came to light suggesting that key witness testimony was fabricated, [and] other material evidence” was withheld. Plaintiffs asserted Brady claims, malicious prosecution claims, and fabrication of evidence claims against defendants. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment only in part. They appealed. The court first considered their Heck argument, and held that it has been established that a “Heck claim does not fall under either the collateral order doctrine or pendent appellate jurisdiction.” Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to review this issue and dismissed that part of the appeal. On their qualified immunity claims, the court noted its review is under the collateral order doctrine and its “jurisdiction is limited on interlocutory review” to legal questions, subject to two narrow exceptions. As to defendants’ arguments related to plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the court held that they either were “not properly preserved or outside” its jurisdiction, and thus it did not reach their merits. Turning to the malicious prosecution claims against Hughes under both federal and state law, it first considered whether they were barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs’ convictions were vacated by stipulated orders and under court precedent, stipulated orders have no preclusive effect. Hughes argued that MCR 6.502 barred the claims, but the court held that the Michigan Court Rules “regulate the procedural mechanisms available to litigants, not the court’s authority over its own judgments or its power to vacate a conviction.” Because plaintiffs’ “convictions have been vacated, and the question whether Legion suffered a deprivation of liberty was not ‘actually litigated’ in the state proceedings, collateral estoppel” did not bar their claims. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling to that effect. It also affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the fabrication of evidence claim against Bates, that “a reasonable jury could conclude, based on record evidence, that there was a lack of probable cause for the detention of Cotton and Legion.” It again noted that the determination a triable issue of fact exists “‘cannot be appealed on an interlocutory basis.’”