Child custody; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Parenting time; MCL 722.27a; Child’s surname; Best interests; Garling v Spiering; Legal custody; Joint decision-making; MCL 722.26a; Bofysil v Bofysil; Transportation costs; MCL 722.27a(9)

The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding defendant-father progressive parenting time, but erred by changing the child’s surname without making a best-interests finding and by granting alternating sole legal custody. The parties separated before the child was born, plaintiff-mother moved to Michigan, defendant lived out of state, and the child had lived only with plaintiff by the time of trial. On appeal, the court first held that the parenting-time award did not alter the child’s ECE with plaintiff because the child would “remain with plaintiff most of the time and continue to look to her for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” The court also held that parenting time was proper because the trial court considered the case’s “special concerns and considerations,” including the child’s limited relationship with defendant, the parties’ distance, the child’s age, and possible separation anxiety, and it adopted a gradual schedule moving from video visits to daytime visits, overnight visits, and longer visits. But the court vacated the name-change ruling because the trial court focused on plaintiff’s motivation in using her maiden name rather than whether the change was in the child’s best interests, and “‘parental disputes regarding a child’s surname should be resolved in accordance with the best interests of the child.’” On defendant’s cross-appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err by declining joint legal custody because the parties had not communicated, could not cooperate, and the trial court “could not ‘expect that the parties could agree or cooperate on important decisions concerning the welfare of the child.’” However, it vacated the portion giving each parent sole legal custody during that parent’s time because, when parents cannot cooperate, the court “‘has no alternative but to determine which parent shall have sole custody[.]’” Finally, the court upheld the travel-cost allocation because the order accounted for both parties’ burdens and was not “‘palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic[.]’” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.