Withholding & cancellation of removal; Whether petitioner established that his life or freedom would be in jeopardy if he was returned to Nigeria; 8 USC § 1231(b)(3)(A); Guzman-Vazquez v Barr; Whether the immigration judge (IJ) could require petitioner to offer “corroborating evidence”; Whether removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for his children; § 1229b(b)(1)(D)

The court held that a “reasonable trier of fact” could have found that petitioner-Nwosu should have produced “corroborating evidence” to support his allegation that his father was kidnapped. And a “reasonable adjudicator” could determine that he “did not show that his three children would suffer the rare type of hardship that permits cancellation of removal.” Thus, the court denied his petition for review of the denial of his request for withholding of removal and cancellation of removal to Nigeria. He asserted that his father had been kidnapped in Nigeria in 2004, and that his children would suffer if he was removed. The IJ denied his application, finding that he failed to support his kidnapping claim or to show that his partner could not support the children such that they would suffer an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The court agreed that Nwosu did not satisfy § 1231(b)(3)(A)’s requirement that he demonstrate that his life or freedom would be in jeopardy if he was returned to Nigeria. It noted that it was within the IJ’s discretion to require corroborating evidence, as long as the applicant is given an opportunity to explain the absence of the evidence. A “deferential standard” is applied when reviewing the IJ’s decision to require corroborating evidence, and it foreclosed Nwosu’s claim. “A ‘reasonable trier of fact’ could have found (as the immigration judge did) that Nwosu should have produced ‘corroborating evidence’ to support his allegation that individuals kidnapped his father.” He was also given ample opportunity to explain why he lacked that evidence. As for the denial of cancellation of removal, the court applied the “substantial-evidence standard” and held that he failed to show the required level of “hardship to a qualifying relative.” It concluded he only showed his children would suffer from “the types of ‘emotional strains’” common to any removal case, and while he claimed they “will face an ‘uncertain’ future economically[,]” uncertainty was insufficient to show that they “will face an abnormally difficult economic hardship.”