Due process; Time to comply with the parent-agency treatment plan (PATP); Effect of the prior adjudication on respondent’s constitutional right to parent her child; In re Ferranti; The best-interest stage of the proceedings; In re Moss; In re White; Consideration of other custodial arrangements

Rejecting respondent-mother’s due process claims related to the best-interest stage of the proceedings, the court affirmed the order terminating her parental rights. She asserted the trial court deprived her of due process by terminating her rights to the child (AJM) without giving her more “time to comply with and benefit from her PATP.” But she raised no issue as to the adjudication, which divested her “of her ‘constitutional right to parent her child,’ instead giving such authority to the state.” The procedures protecting “against the erroneous deprivation of that particular right occur primarily at the adjudicative phase of child protective proceedings.” And the focus shifted further away from her “interests in favor of AJM’s after the trial court determined that statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights.” While she still had an interest in maintaining a relationship with the child at the best-interest stage, her arguments missed “that the focus of the proceedings at that stage shifted to AJM’s interests, which by then outweighed” hers. She received “the requisite best-interest hearing, and as with her adjudication hearing, she takes no issue with the procedures used or evidence presented during it.” She did not challenge the referee’s “finding that termination was in AJM’s best interests, instead focusing only on one of several relevant best-interest factors—her compliance with the PATP.” And the court noted that she did “not point to anything contradicting the documentary evidence and testimony . . . indicating that she failed to benefit from the services already provided and likely would not timely benefit from further services.” Based on the record, she failed to show “any error or due-process violation warranting relief by virtue of the trial court’s determination, at the best-interest stage, that affording respondent additional time was not in AJM’s best interests.” As to her alternative contention “that due process requires trial courts to consider, as a mandatory best-interest factor, ‘custodial templates’ short of termination” she conceded such a requirement does not exist. Further, she could not show “that the outcome of the best-interest hearing would have been different had the referee been required to consider alternative custodial options.”