Mootness; General Motors Corp v Department of Treasury; Bona-fide purchaser; Notice; Richards v Tibaldi; Effect of a lis pendens; Ligon v Detroit; State Court Administrative Office (SCAO)

Holding that this land contract forfeiture case was moot, the court vacated in part the circuit court’s orders to the extent they unwound plaintiff’s sale of the property to a third party, affirmed in part, and dismissed the appeal as moot. Plaintiff appealed a circuit court order (1) denying defendant’s application for leave to appeal from a district court judgment of possession entered nunc pro tunc, but (2) remanding to the district court for entry of an order vacating that judgment of possession and instead entering the approved SCAO “Judgment of Possession After Land Contract Forfeiture.” Plaintiff asserted that the second part of the order “would have no practical effect.” The court agreed. On 5/31/23, the circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens defendant had filed on the property, and ordered the notice of lis pendens be discharged. Days later, plaintiff sold the property to the third party (P). “After plaintiff’s sale of the property, no court is able to enforce any equitable relief relating to the property, and defendant admitted that reclaiming the property is impossible. Even though the district court never entered the proper SCAO form of the judgment of possession, entry of such an order now—whether dated in the present or retroactively—would have no legal effect.” Thus, the court vacated circuit court orders relating to the possession issue as moot. It also found no merit in defendant’s argument that P “was not a bona-fide purchaser because he knew plaintiff may not have title to the property” based on the notice of lis pendens. The court noted that a “‘lis pendens has no effect on fixed property rights that already exist at the time’” it is filed. And plaintiff and P “waited until after the circuit court discharged the lis pendens before closing the sale on the property. Defendant” presented no support for its claim that it had “a superior ownership interest in the property. Moreover, defendant offered no support for its contention that the discharge of the lis pendens did not mean the title was marketable.”