Administrative agency decision; Elevator journeyman’s license; Elevator Licensing Act (ELA); MCL 338.2156(4); Supervisor of elevator construction or service; Agency interpretation; Authorized by law; Reconsideration; Bureau of Construction Codes (BCC); Elevator Safety Board (ESB)

The court held that defendant-LARA’s denial of plaintiff’s application for an elevator journeyman’s license was authorized by law and that the circuit court properly reinstated that denial on reconsideration. Plaintiff sought a license based on his supervisory experience in the elevator industry, but the BCC, ESB, and LARA determined that he lacked the required experience under MCL 338.2156(4). On appeal, the court first held that MCL 338.2156(4) requires board approval, passage of an examination, and “three years’ continuous employment as a supervisor of elevator construction or service,” and that LARA reasonably interpreted qualifying supervisory experience to require supervision of elevator fieldwork. The court explained “that ‘we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme[,]’” and under the ELA, work must be performed by a licensed journeyman or someone under a licensed journeyman’s immediate supervision. The court rejected plaintiff’s broader reading because it “would be an absurd interpretation to grant an applicant with only three years of indirect, tangential supervisory experience a license to perform elevator work, immediately supervise unlicensed workers, or both.” The court next found that LARA had discretion to limit the type of supervisory experience required for approval because otherwise “there would be no need for its approval in the first place.” Applying that interpretation, the court noted that LARA’s decision did not violate a statute, exceed its authority, or involve unlawful procedures, and it did not act arbitrarily because the requirements could “reasonably be understood as efforts to promote safety, standardization, and code compliance within the elevator industry.” Finally, the court held that the second circuit-court judge properly granted reconsideration because the first judge “had no basis to disturb” LARA’s authorized decision. Affirmed.