e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 85906
Opinion Date : 06/08/2026
e-Journal Date : 06/23/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Vendittelli v. Bertelle-Semma
Practice Area(s) : Litigation
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Korobkin, Young, and Bazzi
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Setting aside a default judgment; MCR 2.603(D)(1); Saffian v Simmons (Saffian I & II); Sanders v McLaren-Macomb & Mount Clemens Reg’l Med Ctr; Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Notice of intent (NOI)

Summary

Holding that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding the default judgment had to be set aside due to plaintiff’s prematurely filed complaint, the court vacated the order setting aside and vacating the default judgment against the individual defendants-doctors, and remanded. Plaintiff sued defendants for medical malpractice and IIED. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff “that the trial court’s reasons for setting aside the default judgment constituted an abuse of discretion.” The trial court did not set it aside on the grounds provided “in MCR 2.603(D)(1). Instead of basing its decision on a showing of good cause and a meritorious defense, [it] found that the default judgment needed to be set aside because plaintiff prematurely filed her complaint. [It] noted that while the 182-day notice period can be shortened, plaintiff did not meet the” statutory criteria. Relying on Saffian and Sanders, plaintiff asserted this “ruling was incorrect because the alleged defects in her complaint did not relieve” defendants of their obligation to respond. The court concluded that its “decision in Saffian I dictates that the correct inquiry in a motion to set aside a default judgment is whether a defendant showed good cause and a meritorious defense.” The trial court here instead “incorrectly set aside its default judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s complaint was never properly commenced. Regardless of plaintiff’s potential failure to comply with statutory requirements for commencing a medical malpractice action, [defendants] could not make that determination on their own” – rather, they “had to respond to the complaint and present the issue of plaintiff’s compliance to the trial court.” In addition, as in Sanders, “plaintiff made a good-faith effort to commence the action. [She] waited several weeks after serving her NOI to file her complaint, successfully served defendants, and her complaint properly included an affidavit from [her] expert detailing the merits of her allegations. As [she] made a prima facie showing of her compliance with the requirements to properly commence the action like the plaintiff in Sanders, defendants were required to respond.”

Full PDF Opinion