Claims arising from plaintiff being struck by a stolen vehicle; Negligence claim against the vehicle driver; Ordinance applicability/interpretation; Effect of an ordinance violation; Sabbagh v Hamilton Psychological Servs, PLC; Davis v Thornton; Distinguishing Terry v Detroit; The owner-liability statute (MCL 257.401); Caradonna v Arpino; Respondeat superior & vicarious liability claims; Conduct outside the scope of employment; Hamed v Wayne Cnty

In this case arising from plaintiff being struck by a stolen vehicle, the court held that the trial court erred in dismissing his negligence claim against defendant-Teasley (who was driving it before it was stolen) on the ground that a city ordinance did not apply as a matter of law. But plaintiff failed to establish that defendants-vehicle owners “may be held liable under the owner-liability statute, respondeat superior, or any other theory of vicarious liability.” While driving the vehicle, “Teasley stopped at his apartment to drop off groceries. [He] left the truck idling and unattended.” Defendant-Harbin got in it, drove away, and later struck plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Teasley violated Pontiac Ordinance § 114-243, which “constituted negligence per se, or at least evidence of negligence[.]” He asserted that the trial court erred in ruling that the ordinance only applied “to vehicles left unattended on a public street or highway.” The court agreed with plaintiff. “The trial court read the phrase ‘curb or side of the highway’ as limiting the entire ordinance to vehicles left unattended on a public highway. That reading is not supported by the text. The ordinance contains two related but distinct requirements. First, a person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle may not leave it ‘unattended without stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and removing the key[.]’ Second, when the vehicle is standing on a perceptible grade, the person must ‘effectively set[] the brake and turn the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.’ The phrase ‘curb or side of the highway’ appears in the second requirement, which concerns vehicles standing on a perceptible grade. It modifies the requirement that the driver turn the front wheels. It does not modify the earlier requirement that the driver stop the engine, lock the ignition, and remove the key before leaving the vehicle unattended.” The court next noted that “a violation of an ordinance is only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.” While there was no record evidence of the city’s purpose in adopting the ordinance, the court found the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis instructive. It concluded a reasonable juror could find “that leaving a running vehicle unattended with the keys inside created the opportunity for theft and that plaintiff’s injury was within the class of harms the ordinance was intended to prevent.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.