Probation violation; No contact with a spouse as a condition of probation; MCL 771.3(3) & 771.3(11); Wide discretion in setting probation conditions; People v Miller; Distinguishing People v Graber; Order that payment of monetary penalties first imposed as probation conditions remain in effect; MCL 769.1k; Effect of probation revocation; People v Goulder; Judgment of sentence (JOS) clerical error

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant not to have contact with her husband as a condition of her probation given the facts of the case. It also did not exceed its statutory authority in ordering “that payment of monetary penalties first imposed as probation conditions should remain in effect.” She pled guilty to felony resisting arrest and was initially sentenced to probation. But after multiple probation violations, her probation was revoked and the trial court sentenced her to 16 months to 2 years. It also stated that all of her “prior penalties were still owing in the amount of” $4,371. But it waived a late fee. As to the no contact condition, while this case was distinguishable from Graber, the condition here “was nonetheless rationally related to defendant’s rehabilitation. The main goal of [her] probation was to treat her alcohol addiction.” At a hearing in 12/23 on a prior probation violation, “the trial court heard statements from defendant’s support person that defendant’s relapses into alcohol use were often caused by her relationship with her husband. Defendant’s probation officer stated that there was alcohol in defendant’s home and that defendant’s ‘husband was not a supporter of her sobriety.’” After that hearing the trial court amended the probation order to prohibit defendant from having contact with her husband. The court noted that while neither defendant nor her husband requested the no-contact order, her statements indicated she recognized “the necessity of the no-contact condition” when it was imposed. Her “husband was identified as a barrier to defendant’s sobriety based on reasonable inferences from the record, and with alcohol being identified as the major barrier to defendant’s rehabilitation and a cause of her recidivism, ordering no contact with [her] husband served the purpose of rehabilitation.” The court held that the condition fell within the range of principled outcomes. It also held that the trial court did not commit plain error when it “reimposed defendant’s monetary obligations from her original sentence and probation order” after expressly indicating it was relying on the reasons stated at the original sentencing. But the court remanded for the ministerial correction of the obvious clerical error as to the waived late fee in the JOS. Affirmed but remanded.