Jury instructions; Failure to instruct the jurors on a defense of “momentary possession”; People v Hernandez-Garcia; People v Dupree; People v Perry; Prisoner in possession of a weapon (MCL 800.283(4)); General intent crime; Harmless error; Due process; Denial of request for an adjournment to obtain a functioning hearing aid; Prejudice; Sentencing; Proportionality; Within-guidelines sentence

The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for a jury instruction on a “momentary possession” defense as to his prisoner in possession of a weapon charge. It also did not abuse its discretion or violate his due-process rights by denying his request for an adjournment to obtain a functioning hearing aid. Finally, it did not abuse its discretion in imposing a within-guidelines sentence. The court concluded the “trial court did err in viewing prisoner in possession as a strict-liability crime.” Rather, it is a general-intent crime. But the “error was harmless, and, more importantly, the trial court did not err in declining defendant’s request to instruct jurors on the so-called defense of ‘momentary possession.’” The court explained this defense “is a claim that the defendant possessed the weapon with the intent of delivering the weapon to the police or other authority as soon as possible.” It noted that, as a general-intent crime, he “only needed to intend possession of the weapon to be guilty of prisoner in possession. Similarly, both unlawful” CCW and FIP are general-intent crimes, and all three “have parallel statutory structures with two key elements: (1) possession of a weapon; and (2) ineligibility to possess it.” Thus, in light of Hernandez-Garcia and Dupree, the court held “that the claim of ‘momentary possession’ is inapplicable to the crime of prisoner in possession of a weapon.” Defendant relied on a 1985 decision, Perry. But the court concluded it was arguably distinguishable. Further, when “the legal landscape has shifted in the interim, such as here with Hernandez-Garcia and Dupree,” it is not bound to follow a pre-11/1/90 decision of the court, even if published. Thus, Perry was not binding. As to the hearing aid issue, “the trial court rearranged the courtroom, witnesses were told to speak up and look at defendant when testifying, and the jury was notified of [his] hearing impairment. When the trial court asked” him if these measures helped, he stated “that he had ‘no problem hearing’ with the trial court’s modified arrangement, and he did not further notify [it] that he was unable to hear or understand the remaining proceedings.” Thus, he did not show prejudice. The could also held that his 36 to 300-month sentence was “reasonable and proportionate given defendant’s actions.”