Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), & (j); Distinguishing In re Newman; Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Guardianship; MCL 712A.19a(9)(c)

Holding that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was proper under §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j), and that doing so was in the child’s (D) best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. While she relied on Newman, the court found that unlike in that case, “respondent was given a full and fair opportunity to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication and failed to do so.” Here, the termination trial began 576 days after the initial disposition order was filed. And the record supported the trial court’s findings “that the primary condition that led to removal was respondent being unable to provide a proper home for [D] and that respondent still could not do so at the time of trial. [It] acknowledged that respondent was no longer homeless but found that she could not provide a safe or clean home for” D. Just before the “trial, the caseworker visited respondent’s home and observed ‘a pretty significant hole in the ceiling’ of her living room that was ‘a third of the size of the ceiling.’ The caseworker also expressed concerns that respondent was violating her lease by having other individuals stay in the home, which raised concerns about her being able to maintain housing.” The record further supported the trial court’s findings as “to respondent’s emotional instability and its impact on” D. Among other things, “near the time of trial, respondent’s behavior in leaving a threatening note at the police department and questioning [D] about her foster home raised serious concerns about” her mental health and D’s safety if returned to her. The court concluded the record contained “a plethora of evidence that respondent made little progress in addressing her mental health and in fact her behavior worsened over time.” There was no evidence that she would address “her mental health barriers” within a reasonable time to be able to effectively parent D. The court also found that the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that [D] would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care.” As to D’s best interests, given her “young age, the length of time she had been removed from respondent’s care, the lack of progress made by respondent, the bond between [D] and her foster parents, and [D’s] need for permanency and stability, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that” her best interests were served by termination. The court found no merit in respondent's argument that the trial court should have instead established a guardianship.