Due-process violation claim for failure to preserve evidence; People v Dickinson; Whether ammunition was exculpatory evidence; Bad faith; Arizona v Youngblood; Routine destruction pursuant to policy; People v Young; Prohibited person possessing ammunition (MCL 750.224f(7))

Concluding that the destroyed ammunition was not exculpatory evidence and that defendant failed to show bad faith, the court rejected his due-process violation claim based on the failure to preserve the evidence. He was convicted of being a prohibited person in possession of weapon ammunition under MCL 750.224f(7). The court first rejected his assertion “that the ammunition was exculpatory evidence, as it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of trial would have differed had the evidence not been destroyed.” As in Youngblood, all that could be said about the ammunition was that “it could have been subjected to tests.” But the arresting officer did not have it “tested for DNA because it was found in defendant’s possession in his vehicle.” And even if it “was tested for DNA, the results would not exonerate defendant because the statute only requires possession of the ammunition. Further, even if the ammunition found in defendant’s center console was examined and contained sand as [he] claimed, defendant did not assert the ammunition found in his vehicle’s trunk was also filled with sand and inoperable.” Given that the evidence could only “have been ‘potentially useful,’ defendant must show [it] was destroyed in bad faith to establish a due-process violation.” No evidence suggested that this was the case. “Negligent destruction of evidence is not the equivalent of bad faith.” And he did not point to any specific police department policy that was violated. The evidence supported a police detective’s assertion that he followed departmental policy. Absent any evidence that the ammunition “was destroyed in bad faith, [his] due-process argument fails.” Affirmed.