Medical malpractice; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5805(8); Accrual; MCL 600.5838a; Death saving provision; MCL 600.5852; Notice of intent (NOI); MCL 600.2912b; 91-day notice period; Haksluoto v Mt Clements Reg’l Med Ctr; Premature complaint; Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp; Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of MI

The court held that the trial court erred by denying defendants summary disposition because plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff sued defendants for allegedly failing to treat the decedent’s pressure wounds during a 2019 hospitalization, but did not send defendants an NOI until 2024 and filed suit on 8/16/24. The court first held that the malpractice claim accrued no later than 12/2/19, when the decedent was discharged from defendants’ care, because a malpractice action accrues “at the time of the act or omission” forming the claim, regardless of discovery. Although the death saving provision applied because the decedent died during the limitations period, the court held that the complaint was premature under MCL 600.2912b. The court rejected plaintiff’s reliance on the 91-day notice period because plaintiff offered no authority that the “claimant” in a wrongful-death action was the decedent, and the records sent to other providers referenced the decedent’s admission to defendant-hospital, meaning plaintiff “could reasonably have identified” defendants earlier. The court further concluded that even assuming the 91-day period applied, plaintiff filed too soon because, under Haksluoto, “the entire no-suit waiting period must expire before a suit may be filed,” and the complaint was filed on “day 91.” Finally, the court held that the trial court could not excuse the premature filing for lack of prejudice because Burton held that filing before the notice period expires “renders the complaint insufficient to commence the action,” and Tyra held that MCL 600.2301 cannot save a case when “‘there never were pending actions[.]’” Reversed and remanded.