Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims; Conspiracy claims; Qualified immunity; Absolute immunity; Monell v Department of Soc Servs claim against a city

The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs-Reguli and Hancock’s malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, holding that defendants were entitled to either qualified immunity or absolute immunity. Reguli, a lawyer and parents’ rights activist, helped her client, Hancock, evade a state-court order that would separate her from her child. Hancock was charged with a felony, “custodial interference,” and Reguli was charged with felony counts of “accessory after the fact” and a misdemeanor count of “facilitation of a felony for custodial interference.” They were convicted, but the verdict was later overturned by the state appellate court on the basis plaintiffs’ alleged actions were not consistent with the relevant statutory language. Plaintiffs sued on various federal and state claims, which were dismissed. The issues on appeal here included federal malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, and a Monell claim. As to the malicious prosecution claims, plaintiffs argued there was no probable cause to prosecute them where they had not committed a crime. The court has “explored the possibility that reasonable legal mistakes can create probable cause.” To determine whether defendants had probable cause, a court “‘need only decide whether the officers’ interpretation sinks to unreasonable.’” But it did not have to conclusively decide that here because the individual defendants were entitled to immunity on other grounds. It held that defendants-Russ and O’Neil were entitled to qualified immunity. Even “if the lack of a visitation order was material, the plaintiffs don’t cite a single case—state or federal—that requires officers to disclose the absence of any arguably material information during an investigation.” Also entitled to qualified immunity was the lawyer for the state Department of Children’s Services, whose “conduct was well-within the bounds of her discretionary functions.” And defendants-prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity for omitting certain language from the indictment given that “drafting the indictment is a prosecutor’s key function in initiating a prosecution.” Immunity was also fatal to the conspiracy claims. As to the Monell claim against defendant-city, which relied on a ratification theory, the court found that plaintiffs misunderstood ratification. Because “O’Neil’s decisions were ‘constrained by the official policies of [the police chief],’ he lacked ‘final policymaking authority.’” As a result, plaintiffs could not “bring a successful Monell claim against the city, even if the officers violated their constitutional rights.”