Personal jurisdiction under the civil RICO statute; 18 USC § 1965(b); FedRCivP 4(k)(1)(C); Venue; § 1965(a); Whether “the ends of justice” required the Michigan district court to exercise jurisdiction

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court lacked authority to exercise personal jurisdiction in this civil RICO case where there were no “minimum contacts” established as to a group of defendants, and “the ends of justice” did not require that they be sued in Michigan. The Michigan putative class members sued one defendant (Waller) residing in North Carolina “and nine other defendants (the proliferous Trivest entities) residing in Florida” under RICO and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act for allegedly engaging in racketeering when selling them solar panel systems. Venue was proper “in Michigan because Waller undisputedly has minimum contacts there. But” it was undisputed “that the Trivest defendants have zero contacts with Michigan[.]” The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that it had personal jurisdiction over the Trivest defendants under § 1965(b), “which expands a district court’s personal jurisdiction when ‘it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court[].’” On appeal, the court first reviewed the venue provision, § 1965(a), which provides that “a civil RICO action may be ‘instituted’ only in a district where a defendant ‘resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.’” It held that such an action can only be brought in a district where “minimum contacts” are established as to at least one defendant. Here, Waller had such contacts, but the other nine defendants had none. The question then became “whether the ‘ends of justice require’ that this suit be litigated in Michigan—when all nine of the Trivest defendants reside in Florida, and Waller’s company (which sold the solar-panel systems to these plaintiffs) apparently had an office there.” The court concluded “that neither the plaintiffs nor the district court . . . have identified reasons that ‘require’ litigation of this suit in Michigan.” The court held “that interests of convenience cannot ‘require,’ for purposes of § 1965(b), that a defendant be haled into a district in which it lacks minimum contacts.” Thus, it reversed the order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and remanded. Further, as “the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Trivest defendants . . . it lacked power to decide their motions to compel arbitration” and the court vacated the order denying those motions.