Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; Second-degree murder; Parolable life sentence; Young adult offender; People v Taylor; People v Parks; People v Stovall; Motion for relief from judgment

The court held that defendant’s parolable life sentence for second-degree murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16 under current binding caselaw. Defendant was 20 years old when she was involved in a shooting that resulted in two deaths. She pled guilty to two counts of open murder, was convicted after a degree hearing of two counts of second-degree murder, and received concurrent parolable life sentences. On remand from the Supreme Court to consider her appeal in light of Taylor, the court first held that no current case required relief for a 20-year-old convicted of second-degree murder who received an individualized, nonmandatory parolable life sentence. Parks did not apply because it involved “first-degree murder, mandatory life without the possibility of parole, and applied only to 18-year-olds[.]” Stovall was closer because it involved “a parolable life sentence for second-degree murder,” but it applied only to “actual juveniles[.]” And Taylor did not alter the result because, although it applied to 19- and 20-year-olds, it involved “first-degree murder and mandatory life without parole.” The court next declined to extend those cases because defendant relied only on the “bare fact” that she was 20 years old when she participated in murder and offered no factual record, expert report, expert testimony, lay testimony, or request for judicial notice to support a broader constitutional rule. Because the record contained no basis to conclude that either the Legislature or the sentencing judge acted in an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual manner, the trial court did not reversibly err by denying relief. Affirmed.