Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(3); Ineffective assistance of trial & appellate counsel; Prejudice

The court held that defendant could not establish the prejudice element of his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims and thus, could not show the good cause required for his motion for relief from judgment. He pled guilty to first-degree child abuse and first-degree child abuse in the presence of another child. The trial court denied his motion for relief from judgment. On appeal, the court concluded that even if it accepted his claims “that trial counsel’s failure to object to the plea-taking process or the factual basis underlying his guilty plea, as well as appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue in the prior appeal, was objectively unreasonable,” he failed to show he was prejudiced. He did not contend “on appeal that, had he been read his rights or had counsel objected to the trial court’s factual bases, he would not have” pled guilty. Instead, he asserted these errors required “reversal to give him the opportunity to revoke his plea or ‘allow it to stand’ in other words, defendant has not claimed that he would actually revoke his plea even if he was granted the relief he seeks.” Given that he “was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s alleged errors, he cannot show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.” Further, because he failed to show “that trial counsel was ineffective, his appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the alleged defects in the plea proceedings was not objectively unreasonable.” As a result, he could not “establish good cause for failing to raise such grounds in his direct appeal[,]” and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. Affirmed.