Obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d; First Amendment; Right to film police; Time, place, & manner restrictions; Overbreadth; People v Morris; As-applied challenge; Traffic stop safety; People v Campbell; Void for vagueness; Fair notice; Brady v Maryland violation; Bill of particulars; MCR 6.112(E); Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court held that defendant’s conviction of obstructing a police officer did not violate his First Amendment rights and that MCL 750.81d was not overbroad or void for vagueness. Defendant, a self-described “First Amendment Auditor,” recorded a nighttime traffic stop but repeatedly moved closer after a trooper directed him to stay back, turned on his phone flash toward the trooper, and ignored warnings that he was interfering with the stop. The court first held that the First Amendment protects recording police in public, agreeing that “there is a constitutional right to film governmental officials engaged in their duties in a public place,” but the right is not unlimited and remains “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.” The court next held that MCL 750.81d is not facially overbroad because Morris held the statute does not permit conviction “solely on the basis of constitutionally protected speech” and requires “some physical refusal to comply with a command[.]” The court also held that the statute was constitutional as applied because the trooper never ordered defendant to stop filming and instead gave location and flash-related directions tied to officer safety. The court reasoned that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger,” and defendant’s conduct “impeded the troopers’ ability to conduct the traffic stop” by forcing one trooper to stop processing the driver’s information and assist with defendant. The court further held that the commands were narrowly tailored because defendant still had “a close position from which he could film the traffic stop,” while giving officers room to “efficiently and safely complete” it. As to vagueness, the court held that MCL 750.81d gives fair notice because the obstruction provision reaches a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command, and its limitation to “physical” interference does not reach pure speech. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s remaining Brady, bill-of-particulars, cumulative-error, and ineffective-assistance arguments because the alleged prosecutor-office relationship with one of the troopers was not suppressed or material, the preliminary exam gave adequate notice, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless arguments. Affirmed.