Tax foreclosure surplus proceeds; The General Property Tax Act; MCL 211.78t; Claim accrual; Schafer v Kent Cnty; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Already extinguished claims; Failure to pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period; Limitations period for claims against the state; MCL 600.6452(1); Class-action tolling; State Treasurer’s standing; Equitable estoppel

The court held that because respondents failed to “pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period, their claims” for surplus proceeds from tax foreclosure sales “were time-barred before MCL 211.78t was enacted in 2020.” Further, neither Schafer nor Rafaeli revived already extinguished claims. Thus, the court reversed the orders denying petitioner-State Treasurer summary disposition in these consolidated appeals and remanded for entry of summary disposition for petitioner. The common decisive question on appeal concerned when respondents’ claims accrued. “Was it (a) in 2014, when the foreclosure sales generated surplus proceeds that petitioner retained; (b) at some later date after the enactment of MCL 211.78t in 2020; or (c) when” the Supreme Court held in Schafer “that the statute applies retrospectively?” The court agreed with petitioner that the claims “accrued when the tax-foreclosure sales occurred in 2014 and therefore became time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations well before the Legislature enacted MCL 211.78t.” It noted that “the focus of the accrual inquiry is not when a particular statutory remedy becomes available. The relevant question is when the underlying injury occurred and the claimant could have pursued relief through an available cause of action. Respondents’ argument rests largely on the premise that their claims did not exist until” the Supreme Court ruled “that MCL 211.78t applied retrospectively. But” this conflicted with the analysis in Rafaeli and Schafer. Rafaeli, rather than creating a new right, “recognized that former property owners already possessed a vested interest in the surplus proceeds. The constitutional right to just compensation existed at the time the foreclosure sales occurred. The Legislature’s subsequent enactment of MCL 211.78t established a statutory mechanism for vindicating that right. It did not create the substantive right itself.” And the Supreme Court confirmed this in Schafer. Respondents’ claims accrued in 2014 when their properties were sold and surplus proceeds resulted. The inverse-condemnation claim elements were complete at that point. When the claims accrued, claims against the State were governed by MCL 600.6452(1). Thus, “respondents were required to bring their inverse-condemnation claims by approximately [9/17]. They did not do so.”