Moving violation causing death; MCL 257.601d(1); Proximate cause; Victim’s intoxication; Blood alcohol concentration (BAC); Relevance; MRE 401; MRE 403; Gross negligence; Superseding cause; People v Feezel; People v Schaefer; Speeding; People v McCoy

The court held that evidence of the decedent’s possible intoxication was relevant to proximate cause and admissible under MRE 403 in defendant’s prosecution for moving violation causing death. Defendant was charged after his vehicle collided with the decedent’s motorcycle during an alleged unlawful U-turn, and he sought to admit evidence that the decedent’s BAC may have been as high as 0.081 g/dL. The court first held that the evidence was relevant because causation was an element of MCL 257.601d(1), and evidence of the decedent’s BAC had “‘any tendency to make gross negligence on the part of the victim more or less probable.’” Relying on Feezel, the court emphasized that intoxication alone is not automatically relevant, but here it had to be considered with other admissible evidence that the decedent may have accelerated quickly and traveled as much as 20 mph over the speed limit. The court reasoned that the lower courts erred by considering the BAC evidence “in a silo,” because the jury could consider whether intoxication affected the decedent’s “possible speeding, his rates of acceleration, and his ability to react” to defendant’s U-turn. The court next held that the BAC evidence was not barred by MRE 403 because the combination of possible intoxication, rapid acceleration, and speeding was “not merely marginally probative, but potentially critical to the issue of causation.” The court stressed that defendant did not have to prove gross negligence at this stage, but only show that “‘a reasonable juror could view’” the decedent’s conduct as showing wanton disregard. The court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded to the district court.

Justice Zahra dissented. He agreed that a victim’s conduct and intoxication may be considered together, but would have held that defendant failed to create a jury-submissible question on gross negligence. In his view, “mild intoxication,” driving up to 75 mph in a 55-mph zone, and quick acceleration amounted “at best” to ordinary negligence, not “wanton disregard of the consequences.” He also concluded that MRE 403 supported exclusion because the BAC evidence had minimal probative value but a high risk of unfair prejudice.