Compassionate release; 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); “Extraordinary & compelling” circumstances; United States v Hunter; USSG § 1B1.13(b); Effect of Sentencing Commission policy statements; Rutherford v United States; United States v Bricker

The court reversed the district’s court’s ruling granting defendant-Hall compassionate release, holding that it abused its discretion where “youth and rehabilitation” do not constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release under the statute. Hall was a gang member who participated in murders and other crimes, and killed a woman himself. He was 22 years old when he received a 30-year sentence for racketeering activities (including drug trafficking, robbery, murder, bribery, and extortion) and for conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. He unsuccessfully filed motions seeking an early release, including a prior motion for compassionate release. He then filed this second motion for compassionate release. The district court granted his motion in part, ruling “that his ‘youth and ability for rehabilitation’ constituted an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ justification” to grant relief. It denied him immediate release but reduced his sentence by eight years. The government appealed. The court reviewed the parameters of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and how it was affected by the First Step Act, noting that Congress specifically provided that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” In Hunter, the court held that “district courts can’t consider ‘youth’ or ‘sentencing disparities’ because ‘facts that existed at sentencing cannot later be construed as ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ to reduce a final sentence.” But there appeared to be some conflict between the court’s interpretation and the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement on “extraordinary and compelling,” § 1B1.13(b). The court held in Bricker that when its “pre-2023 interpretation of the compassionate-release statute conflicts with § 1B1.13(b), our interpretation wins.” And in Rutherford, the Supreme Court “endorsed this view.” The court agreed with the government here “that Hunter still controls.” And because it “rejected ‘youth’ and ‘rehabilitation’ in Hunter,” it rejected these factors here. “And to the extent that § 1B1.13(b)(5) would permit the district court’s analysis—in contravention of Hunter—Bricker tells us that Hunter’s interpretation of the compassionate-release statute prevails.”