First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 USC § 1983; Whether a “no-probable cause requirement” applies in the context of a claim based on a quo warranto petition filed by a district attorney; Whether the quo warranto petition lacked probable cause; Discovery

The court held that defendants-city and individuals were properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff-Amacher’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim where she did not establish that the quo warranto petition that was the basis of her claim lacked “probable cause,” an essential element. Amacher served as an alderman on defendant-Tullahoma’s City Council. After she moved out of the City, the district attorney and two residents sought a writ of quo warranto in state court challenging her right to hold her office based on the City’s residency requirement. The state court ruled for Amacher on the basis she had done enough to show that she planned to return to the City. She then sued the City, the two residents, the City’s mayor, and its administrator under § 1983, claiming that the residency dispute was only a pretext for First Amendment retaliation arising from her political and other speech. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, the issue was “whether a no-probable-cause requirement applies in the context of the quo warranto petition that the district attorney filed against Amacher.” The court held that it was “an element of the claim that plaintiff must prove.” Amacher was required to show that the alleged retaliatory lawsuit lacked probable cause and that defendants did not reasonably believe that the quo warranto action had at least “a chance” of succeeding. The court concluded that the quo warranto petition was “based on reasonable concerns about her residency[,]” and the judge in the state case, while rejecting the petition, acknowledged that it “presented a fair ground for disqualifying her[.]” Thus, there was probable cause to support the petition. The court “save[d] for another day whether a fair-grounded effort to unseat an elected official amounts to an ‘adverse action’ in the first place.” Finally, it found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s discovery rulings. Affirmed.