Violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA); Sufficient evidence to support a conviction of distributing a controlled substance without authorization; Ruan v United States; The “nondelegation” doctrine; The “major questions” doctrine; Jury instructions defining “unauthorized” in objective terms & on the “scienter” requirement; Confrontation Clause claim based on the district court’s mask mandate

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Shelton’s unlawful distribution of controlled substances convictions, and rejected his arguments based on the nondelegation and major questions doctrines. It also found that the jury instructions complied with Ruan. Finally, his Confrontation Clause claim failed where there was “no reasonable probability” that but for the district court’s failure to make case-specific findings about the necessity of its mask mandate, his trial would have had a different outcome. Shelton, a physician, was convicted of 21 counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances to his patients, one of whom died. On appeal, the court first held that there was sufficient evidence that he distributed the substances in question without authorization where there was “abundant circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Shelton knew his prescriptions were unauthorized.” Further, the government established intent where each patient “presented to him with one drug diversion red flag or another.” He was prescribing “to patients who (1) lived far outside the immediate area, (2) he had not physically examined, and (3) were obtaining their medications from other sources.” There was also evidence that he “falsified medical records and then lied about” it to the DEA. Reviewing for plain error, the court rejected his argument that the U.S. Attorney General had not been delegated the power to define the scope of authorization under the CSA, and declined to adopt a rule that “a doctor’s ‘subjective purpose in issuing a given prescription’ controls.” The court also found no error in the district court’s jury instructions allowing the jury to use “objective criteria when considering whether a doctor was authorized to issue a prescription,” and concluded that they adequately explained scienter. As to his Confrontation Clause claim involving the district court’s mask requirement during trial, the court was “unaware of any binding precedent that has addressed whether requiring a witness to wear a mask that partially covers the face offends the ‘face-to-face’ aspect of the right.” Thus, he failed to show “‘an error that was obvious or clear.’” And the court found that even if it assumed the district court abused its discretion, he failed to show prejudice. Affirmed.