e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86064
Opinion Date : 07/01/2026
e-Journal Date : 07/02/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Schram v. Dow Silicones Corp.
Practice Area(s) : Negligence & Intentional Tort Constitutional Law
Judge(s) : Swartzle, Garrett, and Wallace
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Defamation; False light invasion of privacy; First Amendment; Defamation by implication; Smith v Anonymous Joint Enter; Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n; Rhetorical hyperbole; Ireland v Edwards; Qualified privilege; Actual malice; Political campaign speech; Necessarily subjective statements; Edwards v Detroit News, Inc; Social media “like”; Republication

Summary

The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiff’s defamation and false-light claims arising from statements made during a state senate campaign. Plaintiff had sued her former employer in federal court, the lawsuit settled, and defendant-candidate’s political opponent later used excerpts from the federal summary-judgment opinion in a campaign mailer. The court first held that most challenged statements were not actionable because they were not “about” plaintiff and instead targeted the opposing campaign, while the few statements directly referencing plaintiff were “neither damaging to her reputation nor objectively false.” The court next rejected plaintiff’s defamation-by-implication theory as to most statements because they had “no defamatory implications with regard to” plaintiff, others were “rhetorical hyperbole,” were “plainly true,” or were campaign platitudes. The court also held that defendant did not republish another person’s alleged defamatory statement merely by “like”-ing it on social media because a Facebook “like” is only “a mere sign of approval” and “does not communicate that statement to a new audience.” As to defendant’s statements that the mailer was “an untruth” and “misleading and untrue,” the court held that even assuming a defamatory implication could be drawn, the statements were protected by qualified privilege because the mailer made defendant’s workplace conduct “a matter of public concern,” and there was no evidence he acted in bad faith or with actual malice. The court reasoned that the federal summary-judgment opinion did not establish plaintiff’s claims as facts because a court deciding summary judgment “does not make findings of fact[,]” and the case settled without a liability determination. Finally, the court held that some of the statements were independently protected as “necessarily subjective” because they had several plausible meanings, including criticism of the opponent’s use of the lawsuit rather than an accusation that plaintiff lied. Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion