Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights under the Adoption Code; MCL 710.51(6); In re NRC; MCR 2.612’s applicability in adoption proceedings; MCL 710.64(1); MCR 3.806; MCL 710.21a; Distinguishing In re Neagos; Relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a); Fisher v Belcher

In this stepparent adoption case, the court held that the trial court had authority under MCR 2.612 to vacate its prior order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in doing so pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). Petitioners argued that “(1) the trial court lacked authority to vacate its prior order under MCR 2.612 because that court rule does not apply to adoption proceedings,” and (2) even if it did, the trial court reversibly erred in awarding respondent relief. The court disagreed in both respects. As to their first argument, petitioners relied on MCL 710.64(1) and MCR 3.806, asserting that they “bar trial courts from awarding relief under MCR 2.612 from an order or judgment in an adoption proceeding.” But the court found no “such prohibition in the plain language of those provisions.” As to their citation to MCL 710.21a, it concluded that applying “MCR 2.612, and the discretion it affords trial courts to provide relief from prior judgments and orders in limited circumstances, comports with the full range of the Adoption Code’s stated purposes and the courts’ role in their proper balancing.” Petitioners also heavily relied on Neagos, a 1989 published case. But the court found it “plainly distinguishable.” And to the extent it was inconsistent with the conclusion that “a trial court has the authority to grant relief to a party in an adoption proceeding under MCR 2.612[,]” the court declined to follow it. As to petitioners’ second argument, the court found “no reversible error in the trial court’s decision to vacate its prior termination order on the basis of mistake.” Respondent moved for relief from the order less than a year after it was entered. And the trial court “admitted that it had based its initial termination decision on its mistaken belief that all of the statutory requirements of MCL 710.51(6)(b) had been met, which was a valid basis for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a).” The record showed that respondent “had an existing parent-child relationship with AYS and made repeated efforts to maintain [it] during the relevant time period, with petitioner-mother rebuffing his requests for visitation unless he would agree to relinquish his parental rights.” Further, it was “clear from the record that the trial court was not aware of this information at the time that it rendered its termination decision.” Affirmed.