Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; The No-Fault Act (NFA); MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i); Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp; Ardt v Titan Ins Co; Chop v Zielinski; Security requirement; MCL 500.3101(1); Exclusion from receiving benefits under MCL 500.3113; Effect of the vehicle being titled in the name of a limited liability company (LLC)

The court held that plaintiff’s usage of the tractor-trailer involved in the accident made him an owner under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i). Because he lacked the security required by the NFA, he was precluded from receiving PIP benefits. The tractor was registered in Michigan, and the title was issued to a nonparty-LLC (Tornado Trucking), which was solely owned by plaintiff. “The title for the trailer was issued to” another LLC (Land Trucking), which leased Tornado Trucking’s tractor. “Tornado Trucking transported cargo for Land Trucking. Plaintiff was the only person who drove the tractor.” He sued multiple insurers after the accident, alleging one of them was first in priority to pay PIP benefits. In the trial court, defendant-Auto Club moved for summary disposition on the basis “plaintiff qualified as an ‘owner’ of the tractor, as defined in MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i)[.]” The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals, in a split, published decision, affirmed that ruling. On appeal, the court noted that, as “the sole member and agent of Tornado Trucking, plaintiff operated the tractor regularly and exclusively for at least six months before the accident.” It concluded that the facts established he “had the right to use the tractor in a manner that comported with ownership for a period of 30 days or more, thus coming within the definition of ‘owner’ under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i).” The court found that the Court of Appeals majority erred in focusing on his “actual use of the tractor—his business use—instead of analyzing the scope of his right to use the tractor. Nothing in MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i) requires an owner to have ‘individual’ or ‘personal’ use of a vehicle, nor does [it] include any other qualifying or limiting language on the phrase ‘having the use’ thereof.” The court concluded that the Court of Appeals also erred in relying on the fact the tractor was titled and registered in the LLC’s name. While LLCs are separate legal entities, the LLC statutes cannot overcome the NFA’s specific language, “which prioritizes function over form by employing the broader language of ‘[a] person . . . having the use of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise,’ without qualification.” The court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court.