Dispute over fees arising out of the post-accident towing & storage of a vehicle; Subject-matter jurisdiction; ; MCL 600.605; The Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC); MCL 257.252e(1); “Processing”; MCL 257.252d; Statutory interpretation; Expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine; The MVC’s special anti-theft laws; MCL 257.252f

In this dispute over post-accident towing and storage fees, the court held that MCL 257.252e(1) divests circuit courts of jurisdiction over claims arising under MCL 257.252d. But it further held that plaintiff-insurer’s (CURE) claims fell outside the scope of the statute’s jurisdictional grant. Thus, it reversed summary disposition to defendant based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and remanded. The court first considered whether MCL 257.252e(1) divests circuit courts of jurisdiction. It found that the plain language of the statute “unambiguously grants jurisdiction over applicable claims (i.e., those involving the reporting or processing of a vehicle under MCL 257.252d) to the district court or municipal court—but not the circuit court.” Under MCL 600.605, circuit courts generally have jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $25,000. Assuming without deciding that was the case here, the two statutes appeared to give jurisdiction to different courts. Because MCL 257.252e(1) was “more specific to the present circumstances than MCL 600.605,” the court presumed the “Legislature intended the former to act as an exception to the latter’s general jurisdictional grant. Accordingly, in claims arising under MCL 257.252d, such jurisdiction rests only with district or municipal courts.” But the court agreed with CURE’s alternative argument that the circuit court erred “in this case because CURE’s claims are not of the class contemplated by” MCL 257.252e(1). This involved whether the claims constituted “challenges to the ‘processing’ of the” vehicle under the statute. Dictionary definitions indicated that “processing” referred here “to the following of the legislatively prescribed procedure under MCL 257.252a, MCL 257.252b(6) through (11), or MCL 257.252d.” The vehicle was towed from the accident scene “at the direction of police, in accordance with MCL 257.252d(1)(a) or (k).” The rest of that statute provides “the process a police agency, towing agency, or custodian must undertake in connection with such a removal[.]” CURE’s claims did “not on their face arise from these procedural steps under the MVC.” The court noted that nothing in these “procedural provisions relates to the propriety of a towing agency conditioning the release of a vehicle on the payment of fees.” Thus, the general jurisdictional provisions applied.