Motion to suppress defendant’s police statements; Custodial interrogation; Miranda v Arizona; Effect of an invocation of the right to counsel; Edwards v Arizona; Whether defendant affirmatively reinitiated contact; People v Tanner; Functional equivalent of questioning; Rhode Island v Innis

Holding that the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion to suppress his police statements made after he invoked his right to counsel, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment that reversed the trial court’s suppression order, and remanded. He initially “waived his Miranda rights but later asserted his right to appointed counsel.” He was not provided with counsel. Rather, police attempted to obtain counsel for him but “returned empty-handed, over two and a half hours later, telling defendant that he did not have an attorney and could not use the money taken from him during arrest to obtain one.” Specifically, he “was told: ‘You don’t got one,’ ‘You don’t have a lawyer,’ and ‘We tried to call one. Ain’t nobody available and you ain’t got no money.’ These statements after the invocation of counsel can reasonably be understood . . . as suggesting that defendant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was dependent on his ability to retain counsel through his own funds. [They] are not consistent with Miranda’s assertions that suspects have a right to counsel and that, if they cannot afford counsel, counsel will be provided.” The court noted that the police “did not err because they failed to provide an attorney.” Rather, the error was in “suggesting that defendant could not be questioned with an attorney present because he did not have the money to hire one.” The court further found that he did not reinitiate contact. He “asked, ‘So what’s going on?’ In the context of a discussion about whether, having invoked his right to counsel, he had an attorney and whether he could use the money he had for an attorney, the” court concluded this question could not “reasonably be considered an affirmative request to reinitiate the interrogation without an attorney.” And it found that, in response to his question, “police engaged in the functional equivalent of questioning.” They continued the theme from before his “invocation of counsel, where they suggested that defendant’s story had holes and did not make sense. [He] was told that because he asked for an attorney, ‘the story you got is the story we gon’ go with.’” When he said he was confused, he was told “that waiver of his rights was the way to tell another story and that otherwise he would be stuck with the prior story.” Instead of honoring his invocation of “counsel, police engaged in further exchanges . . . to prompt him to give a different story.”

Dissenting, Justice Zahra found that the record indicated “there were no violations of defendant’s constitutional rights.” He agreed with the Court of Appeals majority that “defendant’s decision to waive his rights was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and that the officers did not violate” his constitutional rights to be free from self-incrimination.