Trust administration; Civil action versus probate proceeding; MCR 5.101; MCR 5.501(C); Probate court jurisdiction; Final order; MCR 5.801(A); Due process; Default; Trustee removal; MCL 700.7706; Breach of trust; MCL 700.7801; MCL 700.7814; Trustee compensation; Rent; Attorney fees; MCL 700.7904

The court held that although plaintiffs-beneficiaries commenced this trust-administration dispute in the wrong form, the error was procedural rather than jurisdictional, and the probate court did not err by removing defendant-former trustee or resolving the remaining trust issues. Plaintiffs filed a complaint rather than a petition seeking to remove defendant as trustee, invalidate an unsigned trust amendment, and obtain an inventory and accounting. The court first held that the case should have been brought as a probate proceeding because MCL 700.7208 and MCR 5.501(C) require a trust proceeding to be “initiated by filing a petition.” But the defect did not deprive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction because the relief sought fell “squarely within” its trust jurisdiction. The court also held that it could review the removal order because the case proceeded as a civil action, so MCR 5.801(A)(2)’s final-order rule for “a proceeding” did not apply. The court next rejected defendant’s due-process challenge because she knew about the case, received personal service, and chose not to respond, and “[d]ue process protects only the opportunity to be heard.” The court also held that removal was proper because the default admitted allegations that defendant failed to provide accountings, refused information requests, attempted to amend the trust without authority, and intended to follow an unsigned amendment contrary to the trust’s written terms. These facts showed “a serious breach of trust” or “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure” to administer the trust effectively. The court also upheld denial or reduction of defendant’s charges against the trust because she kept no logs, failed to document services, and did not overcome the presumption that services to her parents were “gratuitous.” Finally, it upheld the rent and attorney-fee rulings because defendant’s exclusive rent-free occupancy was self-dealing, and plaintiffs’ litigation remedied fiduciary breaches and “enhanced the Trust’s value.” Affirmed.