Expert testimony; Medical torture diagnosis; MRE 702; MRE 704; Torture; MCL 750.85; Child abuse; MCL 750.136b; Invading the province of the jury; People v McFarlane; Plain error review

The court held that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony that the child victim was diagnosed with “medical torture,” but defendant was not entitled to relief because she failed to establish outcome-determinative error. She was convicted of torture and child abuse after evidence showed six-year-old MA had ligature marks and scarring, had been restrained repeatedly, and was living in filthy conditions. The court first held that the diagnosis testimony was inadmissible under MRE 702 because it did not help the jury determine a fact in issue. It reasoned that while medical testimony could help assess the nature and cause of injuries, the “medical torture diagnosis” did not explain the “nature, extent, or timing” of MA’s physical symptoms. The court next held that the psychological-maltreatment component lacked a reliable foundation because it was based on “little more than [the expert’s] crediting MA’s account of events,” and an examining physician may not offer a conclusion that is “nothing more than the doctor’s opinion that the victim had told the truth.” The court further held that the testimony invaded the province of the jury under McFarlane because, in a torture prosecution, a diagnosis using the term “torture” risked being mistaken for an opinion on defendant’s “criminal responsibility.” It reasoned that the lay meaning of torture “maps closely” to the statutory intent element and that the testimony “‘comes too close to findings that are left exclusively to the jury.’” But the court held that defendant failed to show the error affected her substantial rights. The court emphasized untainted testimony from two doctors, an officer, and an EMT about the ligature marks, MA’s and another child’s testimony that MA had been zip-tied, and defendant’s own admissions that she tied MA’s wrists and instructed her codefendant to tie him up. Because the properly admitted evidence “strongly supported” the torture conviction, defendant was not entitled to relief. Affirmed.