First-degree felony murder; First-degree child abuse; Other acts evidence of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; People v Berklund; People v Watkins; Double jeopardy; People v Magyar; People v Ream; Youth as mitigating factor; MCL 769.25; Miller v Alabama; People v Parks; People v Boykin; People v Snow

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other acts domestic-violence evidence and that defendant’s double-jeopardy claim failed, but resentencing was required because the record did not show the trial court treated his youth as mitigating. Defendant was convicted of felony murder and first-degree child abuse in the death of 18-month-old DS. The court first held that the mother’s testimony about defendant’s prior violence against her was admissible under MCL 768.27b. The trial court reasoned the evidence showed propensity and motive because prior violence against a household member “certainly would demonstrate propensity to have a violent act against another member of the household.” The court found that it was not unfairly prejudicial given the severity of the medical proof about DS’s injuries. The court also held that the neighbor’s testimony about defendant endangering the children in a speeding car qualified as domestic violence because it supported an inference that defendant’s conduct placed household members in “fear of physical or mental harm” or would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized or frightened. The court rejected defendant’s double-jeopardy claim because Magyar permits “a single assaultive act constituting first-degree child abuse that results in a child’s death” to serve as the felony-murder predicate, and Ream permits convictions for felony murder and the predicate felony. Finally, the court held that resentencing was required under Boykin because the trial court showed awareness of defendant’s youth, but did not demonstrate that it “treated it as a mitigating factor” or considered the Snow factors “in light of [the defendant’s] youth.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.