Order to initiate termination proceedings; MCL 712A.19a(1), (3), (4)(b), & (8); Factors to consider; MCL 712A.19a(14); Children’s best interests; In re Atchley; Case service plan (CSP)

The court held that the trial court did not plainly err in ordering the DHHS to initiate termination proceedings or in finding that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the termination order. Her argument as to the initiation of termination proceedings largely rested “on the fact that the children had been in care for only 10 months when the trial court ordered DHHS to file a termination petition. But MCL 712A.19a(8) does not prohibit a trial court from ordering the initiation of termination proceedings before a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. Rather, [it] provides that the [trial] court may order the agency to initiate termination proceedings if it concludes that a child should not be returned to the parent. The 15-of-22-month provision addresses when the” trial court generally has to order that such proceedings be initiated – it does not restrict the “authority to do so earlier when the record supports that decision.” Respondent was warned at the 11/24 permanency planning hearing that the trial “court would consider changing the goal from reunification to termination if she did not make progress with adhering to her CSP. By” 2/25, she did not have housing, “continued to miss or fail drug screens, and had not meaningfully engaged in the treatment and mental-health services offered to her. Her positive parenting time and bond with the children were important considerations, but the fact remained that [she] failed to resolve the conditions preventing [them] from safely returning to her care. The trial court acted within its statutory authority, and” she did not show “plain error affecting her substantial rights.” The court also found that the trial court’s best-interest analysis was correctly focused on “the children’s needs for permanency, stability, food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and finality.” As to respondent’s individualized best-interests findings argument, their “interests did not significantly differ[.]” In addition, the “lack of a preadoptive foster care placement was” relevant, but did not overcome the evidence that respondent could not provide “permanency and stability within a reasonable time.”