Expert testimony in a CSC case; MRE 702; People v Muniz; People v Peterson; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Defense theory; Failure to object; Matters of trial strategy; Handling of expert witness issues; Cumulative error; Sufficiency of the evidence for a CSC I conviction; MCL 750.520b(1)(a) & 750.520b(2)(b); Great weight of the evidence; Sentencing; Mandatory lifetime registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); Cruel or unusual punishment; Unreasonable search; Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to exclude an expert’s (C) testimony, and that he was not entitled to relief based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. His cumulative error claim failed because any errors were minimal and nonprejudicial. The court also rejected his sufficiency of the evidence and great weight of the evidence challenges to his CSC I conviction, and his constitutional challenges to LEM and lifetime SORA registration. He was also convicted of CSC II and IV. The court first concluded that C’s “testimony was not based on CSAAS.” Rather, he offered a proper general explanation about “‘the common postincident behavior of’” child sexual abuse victims. He made it clear at the Daubert hearing “that he would not be testifying that any behaviors constitute a syndrome that is probative of whether abuse occurred.” The court held that his “testimony was properly offered to assist the jury by explaining common behaviors of child victims and dispelling common misconceptions of laypeople on that issue. This testimony was helpful in assessing the defense theory that [victim-]JR was lying about the sexual abuse because of the delayed and inconsistent disclosure history.” The court also rejected his reliability challenge. As to his ineffective assistance claims, “defense counsel arguably erred in failing to object with respect to two impeachment issues, but any such errors were not prejudicial.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence, JR testified about a specific incident in which defendant “asked JR to lick the candy off his penis. JR remembered that JR ate some of the candy and that it tasted like blue raspberry. JR testified that defendant habitually used candy or toys to manipulate JR to participate in sexual acts. Considering all this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that JR tasted the candy when defendant inserted his penis with the candy on it into JR’s mouth.” Further, the prosecution presented circumstantial corroboration about defendant’s abuse. Affirmed.