e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86146
Opinion Date : 07/16/2026
e-Journal Date : 07/28/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Lipscomb
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Gadola, Boonstra, and Cameron
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Search & seizure; Landlord’s authority to consent; Lease provision allowing entry without notice in “the event of emergencies”; Imposition of a jail sentence for a misdemeanor; MCL 769.5; Proportionality; People v Mason

Summary

The court held that defendant’s “Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when her landlord consented to allow an animal control officer to enter her apartment, and” that her 93-day jail sentence for misdemeanor animal cruelty was proportionate. After receiving a call from another tenant, the landlord (T) called Animal Control and reported concerns about defendant's dog. T allowed an Animal Control officer (Q) to enter the apartment with the maintenance manager. Defendant argued that T did not have “the authority to consent to entry.” The court disagreed. Defendant’s lease gave the landlord the right to enter the apartment “without notice ‘[i]n the event of emergencies.’” The lease did not define the word “emergencies.” After reviewing a dictionary definition, the court held that the evidence supported the existence of an emergency here. Due to “concerns about the dog’s welfare, the odor and constant barking that created a possible nuisance to another tenant, and the likelihood of damage from water, urine, and feces,” it concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding that an emergency existed under the lease. “That emergency gave the landlord and his agents the authority to enter defendant’s apartment without notice to address the emergency, which required bringing in an animal control officer to safely remove the dog. Under these circumstances, [T’s] consent to allow [Q] to enter the apartment was within his contractual authority. Because a person with proper authority consented to the search, [Q’s] entry into defendant’s home did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” The court also held that “the district court sufficiently articulated facts that justified” defendant’s jail sentence, “despite the statutory presumption of a nonjail or nonprobation sentence. It acknowledged that jail was not an ordinary sentence for this type of offense but highlighted several circumstances that took this particular case outside the realm of the ordinary animal cruelty case[,]” including that “defendant showed a ‘total lack of remorse,’” had not complied with court orders, and violated her bond conditions. Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion