42 USC § 1983; Free Exercise Clause; Commercial learner’s permit (CLP); Commercial driver’s license; Social Security number (SSN); Religious exemption; Mootness; Declaratory relief; Injunctive relief; Voluntary cessation; Qualified immunity; Clearly established right; Neutral & generally applicable law; 49 CFR § 383.153(e)(1); § 383.73(g)(1); MCL 257.307(1)(a); Bowen v Roy; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer; Espinoza v Montana Dep’t of Revenue; Michigan Department of State (MDOS); Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot and that defendant-MDOS help-desk worker was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim. Plaintiff, who lacked an SSN because of a sincerely held religious belief and an SSA-granted religious exemption, sued after the MDOS denied her CLP application for failure to provide an SSN. The district court dismissed her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot after the FMCSA issued guidance allowing Michigan to process her application without an SSN, and it granted the help desk worker (Tabor) qualified immunity. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff’s requests for prospective relief were moot because defendants were no longer refusing to process her application based on the lack of an SSN, and “no ongoing controversy” remained for declaratory relief. It rejected plaintiff’s voluntary-cessation argument, reasoning that Michigan officials made a “genuine course correction” in response to federal guidance, were implementing policy changes, and there was no “fair prospect” they would return to the old interpretation. The court next held that Tabor was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff identified only the generalized right to be free from religious discrimination in public benefits, while the relevant statutes and regulations facially required an SSN and contained no religious exemption. The court reasoned that Bowen was more analogous than plaintiff’s public-benefits cases because a reasonable official could view the SSN requirement as “the kind of neutral, generally applicable law that does not infringe on religious liberty” despite incidental burdens. Because Tabor’s interpretation was at most a “‘reasonable but mistaken judgment’” about an open legal question, qualified immunity applied. Affirmed.