Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27a; MRE 403; People v Watkins; People v Solloway; People v Hoskins; Vouching; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; People v Heft; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Upward departure sentence; Fourth-offense habitual offender; MCL 769.12(1)(a); MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e); Proportionality

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting defendant’s prior CSC convictions and that counsel was not ineffective, but resentencing was required because the trial court failed to explain the upward departure sentence. Defendant was convicted of CSC offenses involving a minor neighbor. The trial court admitted evidence that he was previously convicted of CSC offenses involving his stepdaughters. On appeal, the court first held that the other acts evidence was properly admitted under MCL 768.27a and MRE 403. It reasoned that although the prior acts occurred nearly 30 years earlier, “‘the temporal divide between their occurrences, standing alone, does not preclude the evidence’s admission,’” and this case was “more like Solloway than Hoskins” because the victims were similar in age, defendant had close access to them, the assaults occurred over multiple incidents, and the acts were similar. The court next held that Officer L did not impermissibly vouch for the victim by explaining that CPS referred the matter to police when it found enough information to warrant investigation. The testimony “was not an opinion about the credibility of any witness” but instead described “the steps of investigating child sexual abuse cases,” and any objection would have been futile. Finally, the court held that resentencing was required because defendant’s 33-year minimum sentence was an upward departure from the 25-year habitual-offender minimum, and the trial court “did not mention it was imposing an upward departure” or explain why the sentence was “‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” Affirmed in part, but remanded for resentencing.