Juvenile offender; Parolable life; Resentencing; People v Stovall; Departure sentence; Proportionality; Youth as mitigating factor; People v Boykin; People v Parks; People v Copeland; People v Snow; Post-parole release convictions; Consecutive sentencing; Extent of the departure; People v Dixon-Bey; People v Smith

The court held that the trial court considered defendant’s youth and the relevant sentencing factors, and properly considered his later convictions, but failed to adequately explain the extent of the upward departure sentences. Defendant committed armed robbery and five AWIMs at age 17, and originally received parolable life. He was resentenced under Stovall to 25 to 30 years for armed robbery and 30 to 45 years for AWIM, each five years above the recommended maximum minimum range. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court considered the Snow factors and youth as mitigating because it addressed “reformation of the offender” and “protection of society,” discussed defendant’s developing brain, childhood, family, and substance abuse, and expressly stated that it was taking those circumstances into account. The court next held that the trial court could rely on defendant’s later convictions while on parole because “‘conduct beyond the sentencing offense can be considered’” for departure, and his post-parole release CSC-related convictions and drug use were relevant to rehabilitation and public safety. But the court held that remand was required because the trial court did not explain why five-year departures were proportionate. It reasoned that a sentencing court must explain “why the sentence imposed is more proportionate” than a different sentence, and “the connection between the reasons given for departure and the extent of the departure” was unclear. Remanded for further articulation or resentencing.