e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86223
Opinion Date : 07/23/2026
e-Journal Date : 07/24/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Mann
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law Constitutional Law
Judge(s) : Cameron, Boonstra, and Swartzle
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Issues:

School threats; MCL 750.235b(1) & (2); True threats; First Amendment; Bindover; Probable cause; Specific intent; Overt act; Threats against school employees involving a firearm; Counterman v Colorado; Virginia v Black; People v Johnson; People v Gerhard

Summary

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s bindover under MCL 750.235b(2), and that his alleged statements could be treated as unprotected true threats rather than protected speech. Defendant, a high school senior who had been banned from school property, allegedly said at a friend’s house that if the school did not let him walk at graduation, he “was going to go in and shoot the principal and the teachers,” and he also talked about killing the school liaison officer. The district court bound him over, and the circuit court denied his motion to quash. On appeal, the court held that MCL 750.235b must be construed to prohibit only “true threats” to avoid violating the First Amendment. It concluded that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence at the preliminary examination because the witness testified he understood the statements to mean defendant “was going to kill them,” believed he was “more serious about it” than other things he said, and thought he “seemed real sincere.” The court rejected his claim that he was merely venting or was a known blowhard because disputes about his actual intent “must be reserved to the trier of fact.” It also held that the witness’s two-week delay in reporting the statements did not defeat bindover because, in Michigan, “the threat is completed when the speaker intentionally communicates the threat to the listener.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that a true threat must be communicated directly to the intended target, explaining that the statute requires a threat to be “communicated to someone” but not “directly communicated to its intended target.” Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion