Competency to stand trial; People v Kammeraad; MCL 330.2020(1); The trial court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a competency evaluation; Waiver of the right to counsel; People v Russell; MCR 6.005(D); Joinder of defendant’s cases; MCR 6.120(B); People v Abraham

The court held that the trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation of defendant, and that his trial attorneys were not ineffective for failing to request one. It also held that the trial court did not err in accepting his waiver of the right to counsel, or in determining that joinder of his cases was appropriate. He was convicted in one case of first-degree murder, FIP, and felony-firearm. In the other case he was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, CCW, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. The court previously remanded the “case ‘for a competency evaluation, evidentiary hearing, and decision regarding whether defendant was competent to stand trial or waive his right to counsel.’” The trial court on remand ultimately determined that he “‘was competent to stand trial and to waive his right to counsel.’” As to the failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation, on remand the trial court “extensively considered the procedural facts of this case, the prior court’s analysis and reasoning in letting defendant represent himself, and” the opposing reports of two doctors. “Even considering the forensic experts’ disagreement, [it] determined that defendant failed to overcome the presumption that he was competent to stand trial.” The court was likewise “not persuaded that a bona fide doubt was established sufficient to question defendant’s competency at the time of trial.” And because he failed to make such a showing, he necessarily could not show that his various trial attorneys “were ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation.” As to his waiver of counsel, on several occasions “the trial court repeatedly warned defendant of the dangers of self-representation; inquired whether that was nonetheless [his] desire; admonished him that disruptions to court proceedings would not be tolerated; and reiterated that [he] would be held to the same standards as an attorney, even going so far as to quiz” him about “aspects of trial procedure and the rules of evidence. Each time, [he] definitively expressed his desire to represent himself, even in the face of the trial court informing defendant—out of the presence of the jury—of what a poor job he was doing. Further, [it] complied with MCR 6.005(D) and had defense counsel remain as standby counsel.” Affirmed.