Applications for withholding of removal & protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); Persecution based on membership in a protected group; Nexus; Likelihood of torture upon return; Motion to suppress evidence on Fourth & Fifth Amendment grounds; Claim that a police stop was pretextual & racially motivated; Application of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings; “Egregious violation”; Prima facie case of an illegal stop; Coercion claim; Alleged violation of 8 CFR § 287.8 (c)(2)(vii); Motion to terminate or remand proceedings based on the notice to appear; 8 USC § 1229(a)(1); Date & time requirements; Forfeited objection; Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); Immigration judge (IJ); Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The court held that petitioner-Perez-Hernandez’s motion to suppress was properly denied. Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to terminate or remand proceedings. His withholding-of-removal claim failed because he did not “show a nexus between his alleged persecution and his proposed social groups.” Finally, substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that he failed to show it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon returning to Guatemala. Thus, the court denied his petition for review of the BIA’s orders. After a police officer saw petitioner discard a cigarette butt on the street, he confronted him and asked for identification. Petitioner was charged with possessing false identification and obstructing official business. The DHS initiated removal proceedings. He unsuccessfully “moved to suppress evidence of his alienage and identity, alleging that the police and DHS agents violated the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and federal regulations prohibiting coercion.” The court assumed “without deciding that a stop based solely on race is an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, which would permit the use of the exclusionary rule. But Perez-Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment claim still fails because he did not establish a prima facie case of an illegal stop.” As to his Fifth Amendment claim, it held that no due-process violation occurred. His “statements (or misstatements) to law enforcement about his identity were probative. And [he] failed to show that there was anything fundamentally unfair about the government relying on those statements.” He also did not show a self-incrimination violation. Even assuming “that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies in removal proceedings,” he failed to establish “a prima facie case that he made involuntary statements to law enforcement.” He also did not show coercion in violation of § 287.8 (c)(2)(vii). As to his renewed motion to terminate his removal proceedings, he “did not object to his notice to appear until after the issuance of the IJ’s decision. So he forfeited that objection.” Next, the court noted that fear “of ‘retribution solely over personal matters’” did not qualify him for withholding-of-removal relief.