Medical malpractice; Wrongful-death saving provision; MCL 600.5852; Notice of intent (NOI); MCL 600.2912b; Tolling; MCL 600.5856(c); Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5805(8); Stare decisis; Waltz v Wyse; Miller v Mercy Mem’l Hosp; Lindsey v Harper Hosp; Omelenchuk v City of Warren

The court held that the medical-malpractice NOI tolling provision in MCL 600.5856(c) can toll the wrongful-death saving period in MCL 600.5852. Thus, it overturned Waltz. Plaintiff-personal representative sued defendants for medical malpractice after the decedent died from a pulmonary embolism. The trial court granted summary disposition and the Court of Appeals affirmed under Waltz, which held that NOI tolling does not apply to MCL 600.5852. On appeal, the court held that Waltz was wrongly decided because MCL 600.5852 is itself a limitations period subject to MCL 600.5856(c). It reasoned that MCL 600.5852 “saves” an action because it “extends the period of limitations,” and the “natural implication” is that it “creates a new limitations period” subject to tolling. The court further concluded that earlier cases supported this reading because MCL 600.5852 had been treated as a statute that could time-bar an action, meaning it functioned as a limitations period. It also held there was “no principled reason” or “demonstrated legislative intent” to require personal representatives to comply with MCL 600.2912b’s NOI requirement while denying them MCL 600.5856’s “accompanying tolling benefits.” The court next held that stare decisis did not require retaining Waltz. It reasoned that Waltz had faced “widespread and consistent criticism,” created a “piecemeal application” of the statutes that a prospective plaintiff would not anticipate, and affected only “a small set of litigants.” The court also found reliance interests weak because medical providers could not have “altered their behavior” in reliance on a procedural defense to claims not yet filed. Because plaintiff sent the NOI before the wrongful-death saving period expired and received statutory tolling, her complaint was timely. Reversed and remanded.

Justice Zahra dissented. He would have retained Waltz, reasoning that MCL 600.5852 cannot be treated as a limitations period because it refers to a separate “period of limitations” and permits suit after “the period of limitations has run.” He also emphasized that the Legislature amended MCL 600.5852 after Waltz without changing the language the decision relied on.

Justice Thomas dissented separately, joined by Justice Zahra. She agreed Waltz was likely wrongly decided, but saw no “compelling reason” to overrule it. She reasoned that it created an “administrable procedural rule” that had governed for more than 20 years, affected a narrow class of litigants, and had not caused substantial real-world harm because there were “many steps” available to file a timely action notwithstanding Waltz.