Resentencing hearing pursuant to MCL 769.25a & Miller v Alabama; Precondition to the admission of a defendant’s psychological evidence; Compelling defendant to submit to a psychological evaluation conducted by a prosecution expert; Constitutional rights against self-incrimination; Distinguishing Estelle v Smith; Buchanan v Kentucky; Kansas v Cheever; Rebuttal evidence; Life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

The court held “that a trial court may compel a defendant to submit to a psychological examination by a prosecution expert as a precondition to admitting the defendant’s own expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing.” But any evidence obtained during such an exam is only admissible as rebuttal. Defendant-Black was convicted of first-degree felony murder and other crimes for the murder, rape, and robbery of a woman in 1987, when he was 15. He was sentenced to LWOP. At his first Miller resentencing hearing, he presented evidence from a licensed forensic psychologist. The trial court reimposed the LWOP sentence. While his appeal was pending, the court issued an opinion concerning the burden of proof at a Miller hearing. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for a second Miller hearing. Ahead of that hearing, “the trial court entered an order, giving Black the choice to either submit to a psychological examination conducted by an expert chosen by the prosecution or forgo the ability to introduce his own expert psychological evidence at the hearing.” The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court held “that if a defendant indicates an intent to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing, a trial court may compel the defendant to undergo a similar examination by a prosecution expert, consistent with the defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination.” In this case, the trial court’s order did not violate Black’s “constitutional rights against self-incrimination because” it gave him “the choice of whether to submit to a court-ordered psychological examination ahead of his Miller hearing.”  But the court clarified “that any evidence gathered during the prosecution expert’s examination, or derived from such an examination, is admissible solely as rebuttal evidence and may not be admitted during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.” The court vacated the trial court’s orders to the extent it “sua sponte incorporated the record from the first Miller hearing, and to the extent the trial court relied on Black’s indication of intent to introduce psychological evidence during the first Miller hearing,” and remanded.

Concurring, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s conclusion. She wrote “separately to highlight that the federal and state caselaw that we rely on permits, but guards the scope of, a compelled examination and resulting testimony.”