Imposition of a lengthy term-of-years sentence on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder; People v Stovall; Miller v Alabama; “Cruel or unusual punishment”; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; People v Bullock; Retroactivity; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(2); Proportionality; People v Milbourn; People v Boykin

The court held that the term-of-years sentence imposed on defendant for second-degree murder committed when he was 16 (a minimum sentence of 50 years and a maximum of 75 years) was grossly disproportionate and violated Const 1963, art 1, § 16. The crimes giving rise to this case occurred in 1992. In 2021 defendant moved for relief from judgment, challenging his sentence as unconstitutional and disproportionate in light of Miller. The Court of Appeals ruled that he was entitled to resentencing. The court first found that defendant established “good cause” and that, as to actual prejudice, he could show his sentence was “‘invalid’ if it constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Michigan’s Constitution.” The court applied the Bullock factors, and found Stovall’s analysis of those “factors highly instructive.” The court determined that every Bullock factor supported “the conclusion that a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender is unconstitutionally excessive. Like a parolable life sentence,” such a sentence “exceeds what is presumptively imposed on a youthful offender for” first-degree murder, without the procedural protections. “Such a sentence means that the initial review by the parole board does not occur until after a defendant has served 50 years in prison, after which an individual’s opportunity for release is contingent on the parole board’s discretion for the” rest of their life. It was also “out of step with national trends regarding youth sentencing and with the types of sentences other jurisdictions typically impose on anyone convicted of second-degree murder, and it does not meaningfully advance the penological goal of rehabilitation.” The court further determined that its holding here, like Stovall, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Thus, defendant was entitled to relief. It affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the extent it reversed the trial court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment, vacated his second-degree murder sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The court vacated “Part III of the Court of Appeals opinion to the extent it addresses whether [he] was procedurally barred by MCR 6.508(D)(2) from raising challenges to his sentence under Milbourn and Boykin, and” Part VI, which addressed whether he was entitled to resentencing in light of those decisions.

Dissenting, Justice Zahra described the holding here as “the latest volley in this Court’s continued full-scale assault on juvenile and young-adult sentencing.” He found that defendant’s case was procedurally barred, and so was “the claim the majority superimposes on [his] motion for relief from judgment. On the merits, [his] contention that his term-of-years sentence is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual fails.”