Invalid waiver of the right to counsel; People v Anderson; Forfeiture by conduct; People v Kammeraad; Violations of MCR 6.005(D); People v King; Critical stages; Motion to suppress hearing; Van v Jones (6th Cir); Henderson v Frank (3d Cir); United States v Hamilton (9th Cir)

The court held that the motion to suppress hearing in defendant-Haupt’s case was a critical stage and thus, his deprivation of counsel due to an invalid waiver was a structural error subject to automatic reversal. He was convicted of multiple crimes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding in Haupt I that his “waiver was invalid because the trial court did not comply with MCR 6.005(D) but that the error did not warrant reversal.” The court later held in King that MCR 6.005(D) violations “are subject to automatic reversal when the result is deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding and that the forfeiture doctrine does not apply to such errors.” On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals in Haupt III “held that the pretrial periods during which defendant lacked counsel were not critical stages of the proceedings.” On appeal, the court first agreed “with the Haupt I panel that the trial court failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D).” Next, assuming “without deciding that the forfeiture-by-conduct doctrine exists in Michigan,” it noted the contrasts between this case and Kammeraad, and concluded that “defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel by his conduct.” Turning to the critical stage issue, the court disagreed with the Haupt III panel that the 2019 motion to suppress hearing did not constitute a critical stage. It noted that whether “witnesses were called is but one factor that trial courts may consider when determining whether a stage is critical to a defendant’s criminal proceedings.” And in this case, defendant “was wholly deprived of the right to counsel to argue the admissibility of evidence that would speak directly to his ultimate guilt or innocence at trial.” The court also determined that, while his trial counsel later moved to suppress evidence on different grounds, “defendant could not wholly recover the privilege he lost during the hearing.” In the earlier motion, defendant sought “to suppress different evidence.” The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, vacated defendant’s convictions and sentences, and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Concurring, Justice Hood joined the majority in full but wrote separately because he would go further and “conclude that the six weeks immediately preceding” defendant’s trial constituted its own critical stage.

Also concurring, Justice Zahra (joined by Justice Bernstein) agreed with the majority that the 2019 motion to suppress hearing constituted a critical stage, and that defendant was deprived of counsel during a critical stage, entitling him to a new trial. He wrote separately to make clear that his agreement was “grounded in the facts of this case.” He noted that it did “not follow that all motions to suppress constitute critical stages.”