Entrapment; “Unlawful inducement” & “reprehensible conduct” prongs; People v Turner; People v Jamieson; People v Juillet; People v Johnson; Appellate court standard of review

The court held that a trial court’s entrapment hearing factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and its legal conclusion “as to whether entrapment occurred and any other legal determinations are reviewed de novo.” It reaffirmed the two-prong, modified objective test for entrapment, clarifying “the proper role of readiness and willingness within the unlawful-inducement prong” and the scope of the reprehensible-conduct prong. Defendant-Jade pled guilty to accosting a child for immoral purposes after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss on the ground of entrapment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the entrapment ruling. On appeal, the court concluded that “the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of review and erred in affirming the trial court’s analysis because the trial court did not properly consider whether police tactics escalated Jade’s conduct.” The court clarified that under the unlawful-inducement prong, “a court must consider a defendant’s readiness and willingness to commit the charged crime.” Further, the “ready and willing” phrase “does not create a new element of the entrapment test but simply expresses the objective-causation inquiry used to distinguish police inducement from a defendant’s independent agency and propensity.” As to the reprehensible-conduct prong, the court clarified “that escalation constitutes entrapment if it ‘“falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.”’” The court did “not reach the ultimate question of whether Jade was entrapped as a matter of law.” It vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and remanded to the trial court.

Concurring, Justice Welch wrote separately to expand two aspects of the entrapment test. First, she explained why she believed “the reprehensible-conduct prong of the entrapment test could potentially apply to police operations similar to the one here.” Second, she described what in her “view does—and does not—constitute impermissible escalation.”

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Zahra agreed with the majority as to the applicable standard of appellate review, that the “ready and willing” phrase is not an added element, and “that conduct that seeks to escalate a defendant’s criminal liability is relevant to whether police conduct was so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated.” He also agreed in part with the decision to remand. But he concluded the trial court correctly ruled on “the inducement prong and that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result in affirming” that ruling.