Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Retaliation; 42 USC § 12203(a); McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green; Summary judgment; FedRCivP 56(a); Pretext; Honest-belief rule; AC ex rel JC v Shelby Cnty Bd of Educ; Judgment as a matter of law; Rule 50(b); New trial; Rule 59(a); Failure to accommodate; § 12112(b)(5)(A); Medical documentation; Kirilenko-Ison v Board of Educ of Danville Indep Sch; Intentional discrimination; § 12112(a); Jury instructions; Rule 51(d)(2); “Undue hardship”; § 12111(10)(B); Relief from judgment; Rule 60(a) & 60(b)(3); Fraud; Waiver; Jones v Illinois Cent RR Co

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court properly granted defendant-employer (the City) summary judgment on plaintiff-appellant Wortham’s ADA retaliation claim, and that the jury’s verdict for the City on her failure-to-accommodate and intentional-discrimination claims did not warrant posttrial relief. Wortham, a Detroit police officer with physical restrictions, sued after the City terminated her for failing to report to work or provide updated medical documentation. The district court granted summary judgment on retaliation before the remaining ADA claims proceeded to a defense verdict. On appeal, the court first held that she failed to show pretext because the City had a legitimate reason for termination: she repeatedly did not report for duty and did not provide the requested documentation. The court reasoned the City made a “reasonably informed and considered” decision based on the information then available, and the honest-belief rule barred reliance on later-submitted medical forms. The court next held that a reasonable jury could reject the failure-to-accommodate claim because the ADA does not require accommodation until the employee provides a proper diagnosis and requests a specific accommodation. Wortham “failed to heed the City’s request for medical documentation,” and without verification, she did not properly initiate the accommodation process. The court also upheld the jury’s rejection of intentional discrimination because the pretext analysis overlapped with retaliation, and the jury could find she was fired for failing to submit current medical forms rather than because of disability. The court further rejected her jury-instruction challenge because she failed to identify a flawed instruction, and the undue-hardship instruction correctly stated the ADA defense. Finally, it rejected her fraud-based request for relief because Rule 60(a) covers clerical mistakes, Rule 60(b)(3) fraud was not raised below, and she could not “bet on the jury” and seek relief only after losing. Affirmed.