Breach of contract; Employment contract for a definite duration; Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Gender discrimination & hostile work environment; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MCL 37.2103; Retaliation claim under the Payment of Wages & Fringe Benefits Act (PWFBA); MCL 408.483(1); Public-policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine; Leave to amend denial; Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA)

The court held that plaintiff sufficiently pled a breach of employment contract claim and a gender discrimination claim under the ELCRA. But it concluded that she failed to state a valid claim for hostile work environment under the ELCRA or a prima facie claim for retaliation under the PWFBA. Finally, it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to amend her complaint to add a WPA retaliation claim. The case arose from the termination of her employment at defendant-J.R. Thompson Company. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition of all plaintiff’s claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8). It relied on a severance provision in dismissing her contract claim. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that the severance provision language irreconcilably conflicted with the contract’s term provision and thus, there was a fact question for the jury to decide. “Under the term provision, plaintiff’s five-year term of employment was only terminable for just cause. But the severance provision states that [she] could be terminated by the company with or without cause at any time during the five-year term, which purportedly created an at-will employment contract. If the contract is read to allow [her] employment to be terminable in the absence of just cause during the five-year term, the term provision would be rendered meaningless.” Because the contract language was “ambiguous, the trial court erred by granting” J.R. summary disposition on the “contract claim and abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.” It also abused its discretion by denying her leave to amend her complaint as to this claim. The court further determined that, while “not artfully pleaded, plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a claim for gender discrimination under the notice-pleading standard.” It found that defendants’ “arguments and the trial court’s conclusion relate to the claim’s factual sufficiency, not its legal sufficiency.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.