Removal; Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA); 28 USC § 1332(d); 30-day limitation on removing a case to federal court; § 1446(b)(1); Enbridge Energy, LP v Nessel ex rel MI; Whether plaintiffs’ class certification attempt in state court after remand “reset the removal clock”; § 1446(b)(3); Metz v Unizan Bank; CAFA jurisdiction after denial of class certification; Panel rehearing petition; Rule 60(b); Forfeiture; United States v Dairy Farmers of Am, Inc

In an amended opinion (see eJournal # 85842 in the 6/11/26 edition for the original opinion), the court again held that defendant-GateHouse Media’s second removal of plaintiffs’ putative class action to federal court was untimely under the 30-day deadline, and that equitable tolling of the removal deadline was foreclosed under the Supreme Court’s decision in Enbridge. This case was originally filed in state court, then timely removed under the CAFA to federal court, which eventually denied class certification and remanded to state court on the basis federal jurisdiction disappeared with the certification denial. Eight months later, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion in state court to certify a class, and GateHouse responded by again removing the case to federal court based on the CAFA. Plaintiffs argued that the removal was untimely and moved for remand to state court, but the district court denied the motion based on equitable tolling. On appeal, the court first rejected GateHouse’s argument that plaintiffs’ class certification attempt in state court after remand reset the removal clock because “once commenced, that clock cannot be reset by later developments in a case, including those tied to class certification.” The court noted that the prior remand was improper, as a denial of class certification “‘does not divest federal courts of [CAFA] jurisdiction.’” However, despite this, “the district court was not authorized to absolve GateHouse of the untimeliness of its second removal.” The Supreme Court recently addressed the viability of equitable tolling in the removal context in Enbridge, and held that § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline cannot be equitably tolled. In the amended portion of the opinion, the court declined to alter its remand instruction based on GateHouse’s Rule 60(b) motion because GateHouse mentioned the motion only once, “in a footnote at that,” and that “passing reference” did not preserve the issue. Reversed with instructions to remand to state court.